

25X1

[REDACTED]

Military assistance has been an increasingly important component of the total Communist aid effort in less developed countries. It is intended to serve the same broad political objectives as other Soviet programs in the area: that is, to gain entry into newly independent states, to establish a position that could be used to influence the policies of the recipient countries, and to reduce and if possible eliminate Western influence.


The Soviets were quick to perceive in military aid certain particular advantages which economic assistance did not provide: namely, rapid delivery, a more immediate identification with the basic national interests of the recipient and the opportunity to develop lasting political and other ties.

25X1A9A

Arms assistance has offered the USSR a unique opportunity to serve as the sole supplier to countries unable to procure arms elsewhere and as a consequence to establish a continuing dependence on it for ammunition, spare parts and technical support. Among the major recipients a half dozen armies (UAR, Syria, Iraq, Indonesia, Algeria, Afghanistan) in less developed countries are now largely or almost totally equipped with Soviet arms and trained in Soviet methods. In such countries the Soviets have the capability, should they choose to exercise it, of exerting political leverage by withholding spares and ammunition -- although at considerable political cost.

Second, the necessity to repay about \$2 billion in Communist military aid represents a heavy drain on the economies of most

25X1



~~SECRET~~

recipients and the frequent [redacted] the burden of repayment schedules affords the USSR with additional opportunities either to display its generosity or seek to exact political concessions. And the more than half billion dollars in repayments already made, often in the major commodity exports of the recipient countries, has resulted in a substantial rerouting of their exports away from traditional markets and to the Communist countries -- another major objective of the Soviet policy in the area.

25X1

Finally, Khrushchev and his successors have been quick to perceive that in many new states the real locus of power resides in the military establishment; and military aid -- and particularly the training programs for middle grade officers which may range from 3 months to as much as 4 years for those attending higher military schools -- has enabled them to establish contact and rapport with an elite which can exert substantial influence on the orientation of existing regimes and on the choice of their successors.

An initial advantage of the program during the early years, and one which undoubtedly commended itself highly to the Soviet leadership at the time, was that the USSR was able to offer military aid at very little cost to itself by delivering primarily obsolescent weapons made available by its own modernization program. Thus during the earlier years the bulk of military aid came from existing stocks. Since 1961, however, the competitive desire among the leaders of new states for the prestige and status afforded by more advanced arms, has obliged the USSR to provide such items as

~~SECRET~~

25X1

25X1

MIG-21 jet fighters a [REDACTED]. As a consequence, about 2/3 of the total equipment delivered to date is of types that still are in standard use in the armed forces of Communist countries and of these more than half are still in current production in the USSR. And these proportions should rise as more advanced weapons are exported.

The new military aid credits extended to less developed countries since Khrushchev's ouster [REDACTED] coupled with the rapid implementation of the near record level of aid extended in 1964 indicates that the present regime views the program as accomplishing many of the objectives set for it. Communist arms aid to selected countries has tended to alter regional balances of forces and stimulated tensions between neighboring states, and more important, has made the USSR a critical factor in regional disputes where otherwise it might have had little influence. Through its willingness to respond quickly with military assistance to countries which have asked for it, the USSR has developed a number of military client states which are in a continuing state of financial obligation and dependence on it for logistical and technical support. It has helped maintain favored regimes with parallel foreign policy interests in power against internal subversion or revolution. Through the exchange of personnel it has exposed to Soviet influence and propaganda military elements which are likely to play an important part in the future politics of their countries.

25X1

25X1

SECRET


25X1

Finally, there have [redacted] no less important, effects of Soviet arms aid policy. The willingness of countries such as the UAR to reexport Communist arms, with apparent Soviet concurrence, to third countries such as Cyprus and Yemen, and along with Algeria to the Congolese rebels and other dissident groups in Africa, has also served the major Soviet objectives of complicating and gradually eroding Western positions in the less developed world.

While military aid for the USSR no less than for ourselves is at best a calculated risk, all the evidence indicates that the Communists will continue to press arms aid on a variety of potential recipients. The indirect returns of possible complications for and harassment of the West should continue to make the program attractive to Soviet leaders, especially in countries where more direct returns, in the form of a Communist takeover from within, appear remote. Moreover, to withdraw from the arms aid field would not only leave the West unchallenged in this important field of competition, but would seriously damage what has been one of Moscow's most advantageous and effective weapons to counter Communist China's bid for influence in the less developed world.

25X1

SECRET



25X1

COMMUNIST MILITARY AID
TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD
BASIC FACTS AND FIGURES

Value:


\$4 billion in military aid extended to 18 less developed countries since 1955: most of it already delivered.

75% of Communist military aid extended since 1960.

USSR largest Communist supplier, accounting for 87% of total; Eastern Europe, 12%; Communist China, 1%.

Distribution:

Aid highly concentrated. 95% to Indonesia, the UAR, Iraq, Syria, India and Afghanistan. Two thirds to Indonesia and the UAR.



25X1

Technical Assistance:

Since 1955, almost 20,000 Communist military technicians sent to less developed countries; an equal number of native personnel sent to Communist countries for military training.



25X1

SECRET



25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000200110042-6

Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000200110042-6